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The idea of ‘gesture’ is present in the philosophical world in vari-
ous forms. All of them might find an important theoretical groun-
ding in pragmatist philosophy.1 Some years ago there were only a 
few pragmatist scholars who kept the concept alive,and then only 
as a phase in Mead’s philosophy, and even fewer recalled the no-
tion of gesture as an important but obscure concept in the French 
philosophy of mathematics (Zalamea2012;  2019). 
In recent years, the notion of gesture has gained some prom-
inence in the philosophical world, sometimes starting from a 
pragmatist background, sometimes not. However, any author re-
ferring to the concept eventually must deal with the views of the 
pragmatists. These authors include Barbara Formis (2010), who 
founded a ‘laboratoire du geste’ at the University of Paris 1 in 2009 
(begun in 2006 as a website), tackling the notion of gesture from 
an aesthetical perspective; Maurizio Ferraris (2016) in Italy has 
used the notion of gesture in his thinking about technology; and 
Irene Mittelberg and Alexander Gerner have edited a book on ges-
ture as an epistemic tool (2019). Gerner has explored the idea of 
gesture for its semiotic implications in treating schizophrenia. In 
Italy, a couple of long seminars and one new book focuses onges-
ture from a political and economic perspective – Matteo Santarelli 
and Guido Baggio are the leading Italian scholars in this area. I 
contributed my own book looking at gesture from an epistemic 
standpoint, The Philosophy of Gesture. Also studies on Mead, such 
as Roberta Dreon’s (2019) most recent papers, have put a new 
emphasis on gesture. Outside the realm of philosophy, the prag-
matist view of gesture has been treated by Esa Kirkkopelto (2010) 
in his studies on theater, and also by artists of various stripes, ma-
thematicians, and people involved in the development of commu-
nication and technology. 
                                                          
1 For an introduction to Pragmatism see Calcaterra, Maddalena, Marchetti 2015. 
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What is offered to philosophy and other disciplines by the 
notion of gesture? Why should time and effort be spent in clarify-
ing the term? The answer to this question is suggested first by the 
French philosophy of mathematics, in particular in the work of 
Jean Cavaillès (section 1). A second important clue comes from 
Peirce’s philosophy and, in particular, from his semiotic research 
on Existential Graphs (section 2). These two parts will form the 
core of this article, and in the conclusion I will attempt to answer 
the question and to suggest new roads of inquiry (section 3). 
 
1.Cavaillès and resistance 
Jean Cavaillès (1903-1944) was an inspiring character. A scholar 
of philosophy and mathematics and a normalien, he took on vari-
ous roles in the resistance to Nazism. Caught and imprisoned in 
1942, he wrote a short book on logic while in prison. He escaped, 
directed several actions of sabotage, and was finally arrested and 
executed in 1944, a few months before liberation. 
Cavaillès’s writings are extremely important for our discus-
sion; here I will sum up thecrucial philosophical issueshe ad-
dressed and where his thought on those issues led him. In his 
book On theLogic and Theory of Science, Cavaillès illustrates the 
weakness of the epistemic Kantian defense of mathematical and 
logical thought. Cavaillès argues that the shortcomings of Kant’s 
conception of mathematical objects stems from the analytic and 
formal grounds he insists on. Kant requires mathematical know-
ledge to start from apriorism and to be general;according to him, 
only these characteristics can justify the universality and necessi-
ty of mathematics. However, in order to complete his conception 
of mathematics, he is forced to move into transcendentalism so 
that apriorism and generality can work without breaking up at 
any particular empirical, concrete step. According to Cavaillès, 
Kant maintained that «logic has to be transcendental or not be» 
(Cavaillès 2008, 26). However, once this transcendental construc-
tion has been erected, new difficulties arise. On the one hand, the 
empirical content is always there, and it becomes either useless or 
a threat to the profound analyticity of the paradigm. On the other, 
the unicity of space, which is highly questionable on mathematical 
grounds, is the only guarantee for the entire system (Cavaillès 
2008, 26-30). Many years later, Robert Hanna pointed outthat 
Kant’s notion of syntheticity was constructed on the same analytic 
ground (Hanna 2001, 224), and following him, I argued that the 
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weakness of this alleged unicity is its underlying ‘whole-part’ me-
reological scheme (Maddalena 2015, 38). 
Cavaillès understood that all subsequent steps in logic, the 
philosophy of mathematics, and epistemology are an attempt to 
resolve the problems caused by Kant’s fundamental insight of a 
‘philosophy of consciousness,’ as he called it (Cavaillès 2008, 17-
9). Cavaillès examines intuitionism, logicism, and phenomenology 
as keys to a possible solution. As much as he likes intuitionism, re-
ferring to Brunschvicg for his defense of the autonomy of mathe-
matics, he finds it naïve in its conception of realism and weak in 
grasping a technical difference between mathematics and other 
intellectual, cultural enterprises (Cavaillès 2008, 30-4). Cavaillès 
is even more critical of logicism and phenomenology, which were 
both somehow grounded in Bolzano’s insight of transforming ma-
thematics into the science of demonstration (Cavaillès 2008, 34-
90). Both Husserl’s construction of a theory of theories and the at-
tempt at formalization that culminated in Hilbert’s project to find 
ground for mathematics failed, as Gödel demonstrated in his theo-
rems. The basic idea of these philosophies of mathematics was 
that either a judgment is a consequence of a set of axioms or of a 
set of primitive phenomenological structures; otherwise it will be 
proved inconsistent. ‘Tertium non datur,’ but Gödel showed that 
tertium is datur. «On peut y énoncer une proposition qui n’est ni 
consequence des axioms, ni en contradiction avec eux» (Cavaillès 
2008, 84). 
Facing the debacle of his attempts to shore up Kant’s philos-
ophy of consciousness, Cavaillès became one of the few authors to 
realize that we simply have to move on to another paradigm, to a 
post-Kantian philosophy and especially philosophy of mathemat-
ics. But which paradigm? 
Two options were available, which were discussedin the in-
teresting debate held at the Sorbonne University in 1939 between 
Cavaillès and another important young mathematician, Albert 
Lautman (Cavaillès 1994, 593-630). Lautman defended a Heideg-
gerian approach to mathematics (Cavaillès 1994, 605-9), under-
standing that the logicist solution had failed and that it was im-
possible to go back to Platonic ontologies. He found Heidegger’s 
idea of understanding «the genesis of ontic reality starting from 
the ontological analysis of the Idea» (Cavaillès 1994, 608) to be a 
good way to demonstrate that mathematics moved between es-
sence and existence. In this way, mathematics would disclose its 
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«genesis in its eternal way of creating itself» (Cavaillès 1994, 608). 
In a nutshell, this is what Heidegger would later call an ‘event.’ 
The event is capable of creating a relationship among the various 
structural layers of mathematics, especially between universality 
and particularity, and analyticity and syntheticity. Mathematics as 
event would account for the possible existence of theseotherwise 
impossible relationships. 
In opposition to Lautman, Cavaillès contended for a different 
view,which he had elaborated some years before (Cavaillès 1994, 
593-605). The characteristics that Cavaillès attributes to mathe-
matics are 1) construction is an act and rejects any apriorism; 2) 
the foundation of mathematics is in the tradition of mathematics, 
that is, in the becoming of mathematics; 3) mathematics originates 
in experience (in transition) and is a transition; and 4) the con-
struction that is part of this tradition is justified by its success. In a 
word, mathematics is a gesture, a word in the French philosophy 
of mathematics that, as Fernando Zalamea pointed out, is not al-
ways sufficiently highlighted or understood (Zalamea 2019). The 
suggestive expression employed by Cavaillès is «attraper le geste 
et pouvoir continuer» (Cavaillès 1994, 186). 
Cavaillès did not read William James but he understood ma-
thematical objects as correlating to our acts. Mathematical objects 
cannot have an ontology severed from epistemology, describable 
prior to epistemology. The mathematical object is ‘inseparable’ 
from the operation that gives birth to it. That is why to understand 
is to grasp the gesture and to be able to continue, «attraper le 
geste, et pouvoir continuer». A gesture is not an event because the 
mathematical gesture follows a rule, must have a physical aspect, 
and can fail (Cavaillès 1994, 594). As for rules, they must come 
from the tradition of mathematics, so that gestures become ges-
tures by virtue of their belonging to, and changing, a tradition of 
thought. Finally, as in pragmatism, the success (la réussite) of our 
gestures is the criterion of the reality of the corresponding ma-
thematical object: 
 
La nécessité de l'engendrement d'un objet n'est jamais saisissable qu'à 
travers la constatation d'une réussite; l'existence dans le champ théma-
tique n'a de sens qu'en tant que corrélât d'un acte effectif. (Cavaillès 
1994, 185) 
 
Therefore, Cavaillès’s definitive description of experience is a sys-
tem of gestures governed by a rule and subject to conditions that 
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are independent of the gestures (Cavaillès 1994, 601). This idea of 
gesture is the nucleus of a new constructivism or a new form of 
deep realism, as we shall see.  
Certainly, Cavaillès places a clear boundary between ma-
thematical experience and regular (physical) experience. Accord-
ing to Cavaillès, even if a baby is a mathematician in any of his ges-
tures, the baby’s experience cannot be structured according to 
rules (Cavaillès 1994,180). Therefore, the baby’s experience is an 
inchoate mathematics to which we cannot extend the methodolo-
gy of mathematics. However, as Kant showed, the paradigm that 
we apply to mathematics will account at different levels for other 
objects of our experience, including any socially constructed ob-
ject (including the arts) and, indeed, any communication, that is, 
any aspect of reality in which human beings are involved. 
Is it possible to find a rule for describing and defining ges-
tures also in our everyday experience? Finding this would tres-
pass on Cavaillès’s boundary, but would also respect his basing of 
mathematics on successful activity and on its traditions. Unfortu-
nately, Cavaillès was shot by the Nazis and could not follow his in-
sight, astonishingly ahead of the philosophy of his time, in which 
he forecasted the impasse that analytic philosophy had reached in 
every field of endeavor. 
The French philosophy of mathematics during the last fifty 
years forecasted, or put more poetically, longed for, a trespass on 
Cavaillès’s prohibition. Gilles Châtelet goes back to the notion of 
gesture, describing mathematics as a «major gesture within the 
gesture of humanity» (Châtelet 2010, 178). The dimension of ges-
ture prevents mathematics from being considered as either the 
queen of sciences or a mere tool, locating it among human practic-
es. Moreover, in commenting on revolutionary developments in 
mathematics, for example Grothendieck’s idea of passing from a 
world of points to a world of arrows, Châtelet highlights the most 
serious flaw of contemporary philosophy.  
 
La rationalité philosophique n’a pas trouvé la forme moderne de render 
compte de cet événement où des terminologies mathématiques chan-
gent, où des mouvements de pensées se brisent, où précisément la for-
malisation apparait comme un’espèce d’iceberg absolument (je vais in-
venter une horreur) ‘increusable’ où tout est devenu cristal. (Châtelet 
2010, 178-9) 
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Châtelet sees that mathematics is moving forward and that phi-
losophy has not elaborated a corresponding form of rationality. 
He discards any possibility that cognitivism can provide a fair ac-
counting for the powerful rationality shown in mathematics. At a 
certain point in his argument, he asks for a new form of rationality 
in which everything is both evident to the heart and clear to the 
mind. For Châtelet, ‘what has happened’ while we were reasoning 
is exactly the philosophical question we must tackle. «What hap-
pened?» «Que s’est-il passé?» (Châtelet 2010, 181) is the thre-
shold between experience and reasoning, a question that can 
sometimes appear as suddenly as lightning but is not irrational, a 
question that happens when ‘we draw a line’, like in geometry, 
which was not there before. However, Châtelet bases this view on 
a restoration of the term ‘event’ and references to that term in 
Heidegger and phenomenology, even though he is aware that we 
are talking about some sort of «preparation of matter or of figure 
to the event» («une preparation de la matière ou une preparation 
de la figure à l’évément,» Châtelet 2010, 181). Interestingly 
enough, Châtelet underlines the relevance of the border between 
regular experience and mathematical experience. Unfortunately, 
he lacks a broad pragmatist view of experience so that, in the end, 
he is forced to say that this creative human capacity for expe-
rience imagines what is not in experience, while machines must 
stay within its limits (Châtelet 2010, 182). From a pragmatist 
point of view, the realm of possibility as well as the realm of ne-
cessity are part of experience so that mathematical gestures are 
not required to dwell in has not to look for any surrealism, but on-
ly in a rich realism. 
In any case, Châtelet explored the frontier pointed outby Ca-
vaillès. Another attempt in this direction is Giuseppe Longo’s view. 
Longo is Italian but he is also heir to the same French tradition 
due to his many years spent at the École Normale Supérieure. 
Longo, a mathematician and expert in informatics and biology, 
underlines the intertwining of the material conditions of possibili-
ty and the conceptual construction of the mathematical gesture. 
Longo traces the history of this phenomenological and semiotic 
interplay back to the Lascaux caves, where primitive human be-
ings invented the idea of border, a line that holds and limits con-
tent, in both a material and a conceptual way (Longo 2016). He 
then explores the idea of the universal into the particular through 
Euclid’s drawing of a line without thickness, Lorenzetti’s paint-
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ings, Galileo’s principle of inertia, Riemann surfaces, and Grothen-
dieck’s geometry. Mathematical constructions are rooted in a 
«practice of gesture» going far beyond any possible formalization, 
connected with human political and social life. According to Lon-
go, there is a continuity between biology, pre-cognitive roots, and 
potential universality. 
 
Tuttavia, il loro radicamento biologico e cognitivo, pre-umano, rende ac-
cessibili queste costruzioni a tutti gli uomini, produce la loro potenziale 
universalità per gli esseri umani, tutti. (Longo 2016, 39) 
 
Interestingly, Longo attempts to employ Kant to explain concep-
tuality as being grounded in space and time. Again, I think he does 
not see the degree to which Kantian space and time analytically 
organize and limit knowledge; however, he does see the need for a 
change in those Kantian conditions when discussing biological ra-
ther than mathematical objects. Biology seems to require dynamic 
principles describing a story that generates spaces. I think that the 
asymmetry Longo correctly sees as a problem for his Kantian 
reading hides the deeper need to consider continuous change and 
historical a posteriority as grounds for our gestures. In the line of 
development I am drawing, Longo trespasses on Cavaillès’s prohi-
bition, broadening Cavaillès’s view of mathematics to apply to any 
science, and underlining the mutual interpenetration of phenom-
enology and semiotics in any cognitive activity. Moreover, he pro-
poses this interpenetration as the only way to reason about uni-
versals in particulars, showing the pernicious effects of both a bot-
tom-up and a top-down approach to sciences. When we engage in 
science, no differently from any other form of creative work, we 
are neither simply defining and drawing consequences from defi-
nitions nor simply generalizing from examples. We are always 
gesturing; namely, working on a history of universals within par-
ticulars. 
However, in the end, Châtelet and Longo rely, respectively, 
on Heidegger’s form of phenomenology and Kant’s transcenden-
talism. They broaden Cavaillès’s view of gesture but they do not 
see an alternativeto escape from the dramatic need toabandon 
Kant’s paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness. 
 
2. Peirce and gesture 
For this alternative, one needs different tools permitting the 
overthrowof the main foundation of the philosophy of conscious-
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ness: what is needed is to overthrow the idea of representation, or 
better, the dualism between representation and represented ob-
ject or, as Cavaillès put it, the sens posant and the sens posée (Ca-
vaillès 2008, 45). Peirce did not talk of gestures but he found the 
way out of this dualism by figuring out a grounding for gestures as 
the elemental component of both mathematical and common ex-
perience. 
Peirce, who significantly thought that mathematics groun-
ded logic and not the other way around, found the escape from 
this dualism in the semiotic and phenomenological study of Exis-
tential Graphs (EG).2 In EG, a chiefly iconic logic developed by 
means of diagrams or graphs, he found the unity of represented 
and representing. Reasoning happens while we are creating the 
graphs: there is no gap between reasoning and the representation 
of reasoning. The phenomenological and semiotic structures of 
the graphs are the conditions for a development that occurs ac-
cording to the rule of different relationships among different se-
miotic and phenomenological elements. From Peirce’s analysis of 
EG we understand that any reasoning is a transition that happens 
through changes; that is, as a form of continuity on a continuous 
ground (Maddalena 2015, 43-55). We understand also that when 
one draws the graphs, he/she must use all three phenomenologi-
cal categories (firstness, secondness, and thirdness) and all three 
main kinds of signs (icons, indexes, and symbols) at the same 
time. Peirce thinks that the line of identity, which works as a 
quantifier in betagraphs, is a «perfect sign»; namely, a sign that 
blends together icons, indexes, and symbols in an equal or dense 
way (CP 4.448). I use the word ‘gesture,’ almost foreign to Peirce, 
to signify any action phenomenologically and semiotically struc-
tured with a beginning and an end that extends a meaning, exactly 
as EG do (Maddalena 2015, 68-77). Understood in this sense, 
there are ‘gestures’ in everyfield. There are gestures in the form of 
public and private rites, scientific experiments, and artistic crea-
tions or performances. Gestures are more apt to be epistemic 
tools when the blend of their semiotic and phenomenological 
structures is dense. In that case, they synthetize more, that is, they 
acquire new knowledge as they are performed. 
As for mathematics, understood as a crucial field for com-
prehending the normal functioning of our reasoning, a Peirce in-
                                                          
2For a complete analysis of Existential Graphs from this point of view, see Maddalena 
2015, 58-67. See also Zalamea 2010. 
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spired philosophy arrives at the same conclusions as Cavaillès: 
mathematics does not need any foundation a priori because it 
grounds itself as it proceeds. Mathematics is a creative and com-
pletely autonomous discipline that we discover by doing it, as 
Wittgenstein would maintain some decades later. Moreover, one 
cannot find in mathematics an absolute beginning either in a 
naively conceived external reality or in any transcendental world. 
There is no absolute beginning because the beginning is located in 
the tradition of human mathematical practices. Mathematics is an 
important gesture among the gestures of humanity. And, contrary 
to Cavaillès’s prohibition, when one detects the structure of this 
gesture, he/she can apply it also beyond the realm of logic and 
mathematics to any major form of understanding or communica-
tingthe world, in particular in creative fields, butin any field in 
which we apply notions and practices belonging to the history of 
the field itself or to the important artefacts of humanity. 
What is the nature of the escape from Cavaillès’s overthrow 
of Kant’s account of mathematics and science? The escape is the 
possibility of understanding Kant’s syntheticity not on analytic, 
rationalist grounds, while at the same time avoiding a slip into an 
irrationalist idea of event. We synthetize by performing an action; 
that is, by reasoning with our body and spirit at the same time, or 
rather, by performing actions in the presence ofthe phenomena 
and signs that perfuse reality around us and within us. We per-
form gestures as our contribution to the development of reality. Of 
course, actions can be more or less synthetic: the actions per-
formed in a conversation like that described by Mead as a primi-
tive language is less synthetic than a work of theater. Sometimes, 
as I learned from some very interesting performers I met at the 
Sorbonne in an event organized by Barbara Formis some years 
ago, we do not want to or we cannot synthesize too much. We 
want our gestures to be incomplete, to use phenomena and signs 
at different densities. However, in whatever way we perform ges-
tures, they are our way to understand and communicate the world 
and to overthrow the dualism between represented and represen-
tation. 
 
3. Conclusion 
We have seen that the problem of mathematical certainty that 
Kant initiated is still at the heart of any epistemic enterprise. Ca-
vaillès’s considerations of the history of the philosophy of mathe-
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matics illustrate how the attempts to reformulate or amend Kant’s 
project failed. Among the proposed paths forward, the most rea-
listic seems to be the pragmatist one based on the notion of ges-
ture, an action that unites representation and represented. In or-
der to understand gestures, we used Peirce’s phenomenology and 
semiotics and applied the structure of mathematics to every hu-
man activity. We found that the structure, epistemology, and me-
taphysics that hold in mathematics and logic work in a synthetic 
wayto also explain our ordinary ways of reasoning. 
Recalling Cavaillès’s description of the powerful legacy of 
Kant’s «philosophy of consciousness,» we are led to ask ourselves: 
are we abandoning that philosophy? Let us say that any philoso-
phy of gesture opens up at least a different conception of con-
sciousness. Maybe, there is space here for another very pragmatist 
claim. What is overthrown in a philosophy of gesture is the idea of 
consciousness inherited from Descartes, identified by Rorty as 
«the mirror of nature» (Rorty 1979).3 In a philosophy of gesture, 
consciousness becomes somehow more similar to a medieval, Bo-
naventurian view (Bonaventura 1994, 141), less egotistical and 
more fallibilist. In this view, we are free but we are not the mas-
ters and even less the owners of the world. We belong to it like 
every other creature. We can change the world with our assents 
and dissents – as witnessed by Cavaillès resistance to Nazism – 
but our consciousness is always in movement just like our judg-
ments. Our judgments are a recognition of identities in ever-
changing reality, and they move among possibilities and necessi-
ties as well as actualities. Our conscience is always in transition 
and has never exhausted its possibilities. 
 
 
                                                          
3 On Rorty see also Calcaterra 2016. 
